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" to inform you that our aviation policy does not afford
coverage...
By TOM H. DAVISt
A CCORDING to the Texas Aeronautics Commission, there were about
14,000 private planes based in Texas as of June, 1969. This number
has doubled since 1964, and should continue to increase during the com-
ing years. With this number of private planes in Texas, it is not surprising
that Texas was ranked with California and Pennsylvania as having the
highest number of general aviation accidents.
The Federal Aviation Administration says that "there are several gen-
eral aviation accidents nearly every day of the year with an average of
more than two deaths every 24 hours." It is apparent from these statistics
that claims resulting from the damages suffered in light plane' crashes will
continue to increase and represent a greater number of litigated cases.
Since some planes are quite expensive and the persons who fly in these
planes are usually in the highest income brackets, these suits involve con-
siderable sums of money.
While practically all light planes are covered by insurance, these policies
are not regulated by the Texas State Board of Insurance or any other
governmental agency. There are no "standard form" policies and each
company is free to write coverage under such conditions as it sees fit in
each particular instance. Although competition has created some uniform-
ity, there still remains a wide variety of forms in use.
In over 50% of the light aircraft crashes the insurance companies are
denying coverage under one or more policy provisions. No one explanation
for this high percentage is apparent, but there are several factors con-
tributing to this result.
In comparison to automobiles, aviation insurance underwriting is
relatively new and many companies have little or no aviation risk experi-
ence. The lack of governmental regulation and legal precedent has also
contributed to the uncertainty in this field. Additionally, the risks in
aviation are more complex, individualistic and are not as susceptible to
classification as automobile risks. For example, there is a greater difference
between the capabilities of pilots than between drivers, and therefore a
wider variance in the risk. Judgment and experience, important in driving,
are much more important in flying because the consequences of errors are
more catastrophic.
Everyone would agree that more certainty in knowing the nature and
extent of aviation insurance coverage would be desirable. This would prove
t LL.B., University of Texas Law School, 1950; Member of State Bar of Texas; Chairman,
Aviation Law Section, American Trial Lawyers Association, 1968-; Associate Editor, "Aviation
Law," [permanent post].
' Aircraft of less than 12,500 lbs. maximum gross takeoff weight.
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less costly to the insurer, as well as to the policyholder and the public in
general. Whether this will develop as the result of litigated cases, govern-
mental regulation, or through voluntary uniformity and clarity of word-
ing within the aviation insurance industry remains to be seen.
The subdivisions of an aviation policy under which coverage is most
often questioned are the declarations relating to: (1) pilot qualification,
(2) purpose of use; and (3) the exclusions. To completely understand the
complex problems involved in construing these policies, it is essential that
we examine some of the leading cases which have construed these provi-
sions in light of the proof that must be offered to establish one or more of
these defenses.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Under any of these provisions the party with the burden of proof may
be severely handicapped. For instance, under the "pilot warranty" clause
it may be impossible to prove that the pilot involved had the minimum
number of hours necessary to afford coverage. Many pilots do not keep an
accurate up-to-date log book of their flying time, while others carry their
log book with them, where it is destroyed or lost in the crash. In these
situations resort must be had to other evidence,' such as the time stated
by the pilot on his pilot or medical certificate application. Testimony from
the pilot's spouse or acquaintances may be valuable to establish how much
he flew. If the pilot was also the owner of the aircraft, the hours the air-
craft was flown would be some measure of his flying time. Other sources
might be invoices or checks paid for rental of an aircraft. In any event,
these latter sources are only approximations and may not offer the certainty
of proof required by the judge or jury, thus placing the person with the
burden of proof at a substantial disadvantage.
In proving policy exclusions, it is almost universally accepted that if the
insurer relies on an exclusionary clause of the policy, the burden of proof
is on it to establish facts that would avoid coverage. In other words, if the
plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the defendant insurer has the burden
of proving any affirmative defense.
In American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Mitchell, 393 F.2d 452,
455 (8th Cir. 1968), [applying Nebraska law] the decedent was killed
while acting as an observer on a Civil Air Patrol flight. His life insurance
policy excluded liability if the insured was killed while performing duties
as a member of the crew of an aircraft. The court held that the burden of
proof was on the insurer to prove facts to establish an exception to lia-
bility.
Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., 288
F.2d 95, 98 (10th Cir. 1961), [applying Oklahoma law] was a case where
the hull insurance policy stated that the aircraft would be operated by a
named pilot or any unnamed pilot with a minimum of 1000 flight hours.
2 Where the pilot's log books were lost or destroyed, the court in Schroeder v. Federal Insurance
Company, 179 N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1962), held that secondary evidence could be resorted to.
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After the crash, an unnamed pilot, without the necessary 1000 hours, was
found in the left front seat, and the named pilot was found in the center
front seat. The court held that the plaintiff did not have the burden of
affirmatively showing that the named pilot was operating the aircraft,
and that the insurer had the burden to establish no coverage because an
unauthorized pilot was in control.
Similarly in National Ins. Underwriters v. Matthews, 418 S.W.2d 391,
393 (Ark. 1967), the hull insurance policy had an exception voiding
liability if the accident occurred while the aircraft was proceeding in IFR
conditions while being piloted by a non-instrument rated pilot. The in-
surer conceded that it had the burden of proof to establish that the non-
instrument rated pilot was operating under IFR conditions. The burden
was not met since there was no evidence indicating that the aircraft was
in the clouds or that the visability was otherwise reduced below VFR-
prescribed minimums.
Harman v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., P.2d 849, 850-51
(Idaho 1967), held that the burden of proof was on the insurer to prove
an exclusion where a life insurance policy excluded liability for death in
an aircraft accident if the insured had "any duties" aboard the aircraft.
In Webb v. Zurich Ins. Co., 205 So.2d 398, 409 (La. 1967),' the avia-
tion liability policy excluded coverage if the aircraft was being operated
in violation of federal regulations. There was no evidence at the trial as
to the flight visibility before the crash or that the aircraft was being
flown under IFR conditions. The court there held that the insurer failed
to meet its required burden of proof to establish a violation of regulations.
Non-aviation cases from most jurisdictions would also support this rule."
However, the law in Texas as it now stands is to the contrary. In Sherman
v. Provident American Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1967), [hos-
pitalization policy], the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had the
burden of negating all policy exclusions and limitations raised by the de-
fendant insurer in its pleadings. To a similar effect is Hardware Dealers
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Berglund, 393 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1965), ["all risks"
policy], although this case may be distinguishable on the basis of the
policy language. cf: R.B. Company, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 299 F.2d
753, 756 (5th Cir. 1962), [applying Texas law].
3 See also Tison v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 181 So.2d 835 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
'Great-West Life Assurance Co. v. Levy, 382 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1967) [applying Colo-
rado law]; Milliken v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 338 F.2d 35, 41 (10th Cir. 1964) [applying
Kansas law]; Beaver v. Fidelity Life Ass'n. 313 F.2d 111, 114 (10th Cir. 1963) [applying Kansas
law]; Jewelers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Balogh, 272 F.2d 889, 892 (5th Cir. 1959) [applying Kansas
law]; Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Contractors Equipment Rental Co., 159 So.2d 198, 201
(Ala. 1963); Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bukacek, 123 So.2d 157, 164 (Ala. 1963); Han-
over Fire Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 2 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939); Wilson v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 128 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 1964); Leiker v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.,
396 P.2d 264, 268 (Kan. 1964); Braly v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 227 P.2d 571, 579 (Kan.
1951); Bolduc v New York Fire Ins. Co., 69 N.H.2d 660, 665 (Minn. 1955); Drummond v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 343 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v.
McAbee, 150 S.E.2d 496, 497 (N. C. 1966); Abernathy v. Hospital Care Ass'n., Inc., 119 S.E.2d
1, 2 (N.C. 1961); Fallins v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 100 S.E.2d 214, 216 (N.C. 1957); see also
44 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance § 967; 46 C.J.S., Insurance § 1316(6); 21 Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice § 12095 (1947).
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Following the Sherman case the court in Scbwad v. Ranger Insurance
Company, 438 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), held that where the
insurer pleaded that the pilot operating the aircraft at the time of the crash
did not meet the provisions of the pilot warranty, the burden was on the
plaintiff owner to prove the pilot's qualifications.
"PILOT WARRANTY" AND DUAL CONTROLS
Another problem created by the "pilot warranty" provision involves
the fact that with the possible exception of some Beech models, practically
all light planes have dual controls. While some Beech aircraft have only
one control wheel, it can be adjusted for flight from either the left or right
front seat. In either case, where all occupants of the aircraft are killed,
the dual control capabilities create a problem in establishing who was flying
the plane at the time of the crash. This problem can become even more
involved when there are several licensed pilots among the plane's occupants.
These problems arise under the hull coverage provisions as well as under
the liability protection, since a violation of the "pilot warrranty" provision
would void the entire policy.
As in other cases this can be established by circumstantial evidence, the
only requirement being proof as to who was probably flying the airplane at
the time. Circumstances tending to prove who was piloting the plane are:
(1) the alleged pilot is also the owner, (2) the possession of a license by
the alleged pilot with no license being possessed by the other occupants,
(3) the flying experience of the alleged pilot as contrasted with the experi-
ence of the other occupants, (4) the mechanical arrangement of the con-
trols in the plane in question may prohibit take-offs or landing by persons
in the right front seat, (5) the seating arrangements of the occupants, the
seat on the left side customarily occupied by the pilot operating the plane,
(6) voice communications received from the pilot requesting instructions
from the tower or other FAA facility, (7) position of the bodies after
the crash, (8) the condition of the control wheels after the crash, (9)
agreements with the owner not to permit others to pilot the plane or
not to give flight instruction and, (10) if a flight plan was filed, who
was designated as pilot. These are only some of the circumstances that may
be used to establish by a preponderance of the evidence who was flying
the airplane at the time of the crash.'
In the past sufficient proof to allow a case to go to the jury in the above
situation has been a difficult stumbling block. Some courts have required
a complete negation of the possibility that other occupants were operating
the plane at the time of the crash.' Fortunately the recent cases take a
more realistic appraisal of the problem,' and at least one state has partially
aFor more detailed information see 2 Proof of Facts, Aviation (1969 Supplement).
'The unrealistic "beyond any doubt" attitude is best exemplified by Hayden v. Boyle, 174
Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813 (1953); 36 A.L.R.2d 1290.
'Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Cherokee Lab., Inc., 288 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1961); Lange
v. Ryan-Nelson Flight Service, Inc., 259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428 (1961); Bruce v. O'Neal
Flying Service, 231 N.C. 181, 56 S.E.2d 560, A.L.R.2d 647 (1949); Insurance Company of North
America v. Butte Aero Sales & Service, 243 F. Supp. 276 (Mont. 1965); Kullberg v. United States,
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eliminated it by statute.'
In the early days of aviation, the mysteries and uncertainties of flight
coupled with unfamiliarity of the subject by the courts might have justi-
fied a cautious approach to the problem. However, today with the vast
technological changes and improvements in airplanes and safety in flight
and with the mass production of light airplanes which are being used by
an ever-increasing percentage of our population, no justification exists for
requiring a party to establish who was flying the airplane "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." This element of an airplane crash case should be no dif-
ferent nor should it require a greater degree of proof than any other
element in the case or in any other kind of case. The party with the burden
of proof should only be required to prove this element by a preponderance
of the evidence. There is no reason why circumstantial evidence and legal
presumptions as used in other types of cases' should not be sufficient to
establish who was probably flying an airplane at the time it crashed.
THE "PURPOSE AND USE" PROVISION
The purpose for which an aircraft is to be used is also an important
consideration. Policies on most light aircraft designate in the declaration
that the aircraft is to be used for "Business and Pleasure." Under the defi-
nition of "Business and Pleasure," or elsewhere in some policies, flights for
which a "charge" is made are excluded. This provision provides a fertile
field for disagreement when one or more of the passengers is making a
payment to the owner in connection with a flight, or the owner allows
someone else to fly his aircraft.
Besides the problems related to burden of proof already discussed,0 the
271 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Vander-Loan v. Educators Mutual Ins. Co., 97 N.W.2d 6
(Mich. 1959).
sOhio Rev. Code Anno. § 4561.23 (1961):
"In the event of an airplane crash nivolving personal injuries, death, or property dam-
age, it is rebuttably presumed that the airplane was being flown at the time of the
crash, and immediately prior thereto, by the pilot-in-command of such airplane when
the airplane is occupied by more than one person.
"The 'pilot-in-command' is rebuttably presumed to be:
(A) The occupant of the left front seat in airplanes having side-by-side and fore-
and-aft seating;
(B) The occupant of the left seat of an airplane which has only one traverse seat;
(C) In a tandem seated airplane, the occupant of the seat recommended by the manu-
facturer o fsuch airplane when the airplane is flown solo.
(D) Notwithstanding divisions (A), (B), and (C) of this section, the occupant of
the airplane possessed of an instructor's rating is rebuttably presumed to be the
pilot-in-command when any part of the flight is for the purpose of instructing an-
other in any phase of flying or navigating
(E) Notwithstanding divisions (A), (B), (C), and (D) of this section, in all flights
conducted under instrument flight rules the pilot-in-command is rebuttably presumed
to be the pilot whose name appears on the flight plan.
(F) In the event that the occupants and their positions in the airplane at the time
of the crash cannot be established otherwise from the evidence with reasonable
certainty, it is presumed that the airplane was being flown at the time of the crash,
and immediately prior thereto, by the person occupying the pilot-in-command seat,
as designated above, during or immediately before take-off."
Annot., 32 A.L.R. 2d 988 (1953).
" With all occupants of the aircraft dead, there is often a lack of direct proof as to the
financial arrangements involved. Resort may have to be made to prior dealings, check stubs,
records, bills, invoices, conversations overheard by others and other similar evidence.
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real purpose or intent of the underwriting use of the term "charge" is
not clear.
Seldom, if ever, will an owner allow anyone to fly his airplane without
some reimbursement of expenses. This may include only the gas, or may
contain an estimate of the per hour charges for maintenance and overhaul."1
However, the full cost of operating an aircraft also includes the cost of
hangar rental, insurance, interest on loan or investment and depreciation."2
If the term "charge" meant any payment of money, then nearly every
time an owner loaned his plane, or a passenger paid for a portion of the
costs, there would be no coverage.
Realizing that this was probably not the real intent of such provision,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Houston Fire
&. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ivens, 338 F.2d 452 (1964)," held that where a
payment for the cost of the gasoline used was made, no "charge" was
being made under the terms of the policy, since the payment did not ap-
proach the commercial rate for the rental of a similar aircraft. This im-
plies that in order for there to be a "charge," there must be a profit.
However, this case leaves unanswered the question of whether the owner
is entitled to recoup both his direct and fixed cost before a profit is in-
volved, or whether it would be a profit to him if the payment exceeded
the direct cost, since his fixed cost is already incurred. This becomes par-
ticularly troublesome since even direct cost can only be estimated, 4 and
since fixed cost is directly related to the hours the aircraft is flown, it is
even more difficult to estimate."
EXCLUSIONS
Probably the most serious problem to an attorney representing the
beneficiaries of those killed or injured in a light plane crash, as well as
the attorney for the owner or pilot, lies in the various exclusions that
have been written into some of the aviation policies. Many of these policies
have a serious limitation upon liability and present a dangerous trap for
the inexperienced. "'
11 Gasoline, oil, reserve for maintenance and engine overhaul are usually referred to as the
"direct operating cost."
12"fixed operating cost."
"a See also Thompson v. Ezell, 379 P.2d 983 (Wash. 1963). Some non-aviation cases interpreting
"charge" and "consideration" are Rowe v. U.S.F.&G.Co., 375 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1967) and
Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. Olson, 87 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1937).
"4 It is only after the actual maintenance and overhaul costs are known that an accurate cost
per hour can be calculated.
1" Fixed cost can be accurately calculated only after it is known how many honrs the aircraft
flew during the past year. This calculation is always retrospective and the present fixed cost per
hour is always an estimate.
"' For cases dealing with the insurer's defense based on a regulatory violation, see Globe Indem-
nity Co. v. Hansen, 231 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1956); Bruce v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
222 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v. Eagle Star Insurance Co., 196 F.2d 317 (6th Cir.
1952); Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Green, 181 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1950); National Ins. Under-
writers v. Matthews, 418 S.W.2d" 391 (Ark. 1967); Visco Flying Co. v. Hansen & Rowland, Inc.,
7 Cal. Reptr. 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); Webb v. Zurich Ins. Co., 205 So.2d 398 (La. 1967);
Tuohey v. National Ins. Underwriters, 369 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Prasker v. United
States Guarantee Co., 136 N.E.2d 871 (N.Y. 1956); Thompson v. Ezell, 379 P.2d 983 (Wash.
1963).
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While all policies exclude coverage "while the aircraft is (1) maintained
or used for any purpose other than as stated in the Declarations or (2)
operated, while in flight, by other than the pilot or pilots as stated in the
Declarations or . . ." there are a variety of other exclusions found in these
policies. Some policies provide disclaimers of liability in the exclusion
clauses as follows:
This policy does not apply;
(h) to the liability of any insured who operates or who permits the opera-
tion of the aircraft;
(i) in violation of its Federal Aviation Agency Airworthiness Certificate
or operational record; (ii) in violation of any regulation of the Federal
Aviation Agency applicable to acrobatic flying, instrument flying, repairs,
alterations and inspections, night flying, minimum safe altitudes and student
instruction ... (iii) for any unlawful purpose or for the purpose of crop
dusting, spraying, seeding or any form of hunting.
This policy does not apply;
(a) ... to any insured who operates or permits the aircraft to be operated,
• . . (3) Instrument Flight Rule (s) (IFR) conditions unless the pilot
possesses a valid Instrument Rating and is proceeding in accordance with
Instrument Flight Rules,...
This policy does not apply;
• ..while, with the knowledge and consent of an insured-(a) the air-
craft is being operated by an approved pilot who commences a flight in viola-
tion of the terms and limitations of his Federal Aviation Agency Pilot
Certificate or Medical Certificate; ...
To any operation of the aircraft, with the permission of the Named In-
sured, in violation of the limitations of the operating privilege of the pilot's
certificates and ratings.
It is obvious from these exclusionary clauses that some of the language
is so broad as to give the insurance company an opportunity to deny lia-
bility in many crashes. Those exclusions relating to violations of govern-
mental regulations require a knowledge of a multitude of specific rules
covering various phases of aviation. It is apparent how easy it would be
for the inexperienced to plead or prove himself into a trap and thereby
allow the insurance carrier to escape leaving the insured or his estate to
pay for the very liability which they thought they were protected against.
Such exclusions have prompted some states to prohibit them by statute."
"7This wording probably resulted from Weissman v. Prashker, 405 Pa. 226, 175 A.2d 63
(1961), where the court held that a non-instrument rated pilot who flew into IFR conditions was
in violation of the VFR regulations and not the IFR regulations since he was not authorized to
fly under the IFR regulations.
"8 "No policy of insurance issued or delivered in this State covering any loss, expense or lia-
bility arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an aircraft shall exclude or deny cover-
age because the aircraft is operated in violation of civil air regulations pursuant to Federal, State
or local laws or ordinances.
"This section does not prohibit the use of specific exclusions or conditions in any such
policy which relate to any of the following:
(a) Certification of an aircraft in a stated category by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration.
(b) Certification of a pilot in a stated category by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion.
(c) Establishing requirements for pilot experience.
(d) Establishing limitations in the use of the aircraft." Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2439 (1968).
See also Minn. Stat. Ann. § 60A.081 (1967), New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. §412.21 (1969);
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A. The "Pilot Certificate" Exclusion
Many aviation liability policies contain an express exclusion from cover-
age if the insured pilot "violates the terms and conditions of his FAA
pilot's certificate," or words to that effect. Exclusions of a similar nature
frequently appear in other type policies, such as accident and life insur-
ance, requiring the pilot to hold a "valid and current pilot's certificate"
or be "properly certificated and rated for the flight."
Such an exclusion properly applies only in limited circumstances. As an
example, if a pilot was rated only for single-engine aircraft, but was flying
a multi-engine plane, he would be violating the "terms and conditions"
of his certificate. Similarly, if the FAA had taken action suspending the
pilot's certificate, he would then not be "properly certificated and rated
for the flight." These situations are relatively rare, and the circumstances
are easily recognizable as coming within the policy exclusion. 9 However,
insurers have sometimes sought to broaden the scope of the exclusionary
provision by an artfully woven argument that would exclude coverage in
almost every case.
This defense theory is that the FAA flight regulations are all packaged
into the FAA-issued pilot's certificate and, for that reason, if any FAA
regulation is violated there is also a violation of the pilot's certificate. If
this argument were adopted by the courts, the pilot's insurance coverage
would be virtually non-existent since in almost all crashes there is evidence
of some regulatory infraction.
Only three reported decisions have considered this defensive theory, and
in each case the defense arguments were rejected. The leading case is
Royal Indemnity Co. v. John W. Cawrse Lumber Co., 245 F. Supp. 707
(D. Ore. 1965). There the policy provided coverage only if the aircraft
was flown by a pilot with a "valid and current" pilot's certificate. The
pilot did not possess a current medical certificate and thus was operating
in violation of FAA regulations. The insurance company contended that
the pilot's certificate was not "valid" because of the regulatory infraction.
The court rejected this argument, holding that the pilot's certificate was
not invalidated because of this violation.
The essential facts and holding of Berlanti v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 9 Av. Cas. 17,420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), are almost identical to
that of Royal Indemnity.
A consistent result was also reached in Insurance Co. of North America
v. Butte Aero Sales & Service, 243 F. Supp. 276 (D. Mont. 1965), where
the policy excluded coverage if the pilot was operating "in violation of
Virginia, Chap. 227, Laws 1970, effective 66/26/70, enacts Sec. 38.1-389.2 and Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 204.295 (1963).
19 In a suit under a double indemnity provision by the heirs of a deceased passenger, the court
in Mang v. Travelers Insurance Company, 412 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), held that the
term "duly licensed or certificated pilot" necessarily referred to a pilot who held a Federal Avia-
tion Agency license or certificate which authorized him to operate an aircraft carrying passengers
and that a person holding a student certificate was not such a pilot. But see Marshal v. The Peerless
Insurance Company, 428 S.W.2d 190 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968), where the court held that a duly
licensed pilot who was in the aircraft was the pilot in command of a flight with a student pilot
carrying passenger since the student could not be pilot in command with passengers aboard.
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[his FAA pilot's] certificate." There the pilot probably was in violation
because he was flying a type aircraft in which he had no rating, but there
nevertheless was no applicability of the exclusion because the pilot had
been specifically named and authorized in the policy.
Although the only reported cases thus far have rejected this spurious
theory that a regulatory infraction is tantamount to a license violation, the
insurance companies' defense attempts to establish no-coverage remain un-
daunted and the argument continues to be asserted. A typical situation
arose in a declaratory judgment action in regard to policy coverage in
American Home Assurance Company v. Roach, Civil No. 19946, S.D.
Iowa, 1969 (unreported). There the policy excluded coverage if the pilot
had violated the "terms and conditions" of his certificate. The evidence was
that the pilot may have violated FAR 61.47 by not having made at least
5 nighttime takeoffs and landings prior to his flight on the night of the
accident. Because of this regulatory infraction, the court held that there
was a license violation and that the policy exclusion avoided all coverage
during the flight. The court cited no authority for its novel-and astonish-
ing-conclusion. The case is now on appeal to the Eighth Circuit.
B. "Unlawful Purpose" Exclusion
Aviation policies historically have included an express exclusion from
coverage if the aircraft was being operated in violation of government
regulations."0 This standard provision has proved to be quite helpful to
the insurance companies' defense of claims. The government regulations
are so broad and comprehensive that in almost every accident there is
evidence of some infraction of one or more of the myriad requirements.
One court expressly recognized this fact of aviation life, stating "it may
be virtually impossible to have a crash without a violation of at least one
of those regulations." Thompson v. Ezell, 379 P.2d 983,988 (Wash. 1963).
Such broad provisions affords the insured pilot or owner virtually no pro-
tection at all.
After the aviation public became aware of the regulatory-violation ex-
clusion, and the illusory coverage provided by a policy containing such a
provision, many companies began omitting the "broad form" clause from
their policies. However, notwithstanding the omission of the "broad form"
regulatory-violation exclusion, resourceful defense counsels in some cases
under the new policies have continued to make the same arguments of
no coverage if evidence is shown that the pilot breached some FAA regula-
tory requirements.
The villain is a little-noticed provision of all aviation policies excluding
coverage if the aircraft was being "used for an unlawful purpose." Hardly
anyone paid much attention to this clause, and it was almost never raised
as a defense. If anyone, counsel or the insured, had given this particular
provision any thought, it would seem almost obvious that it referred to a
"s Older policies containing the "broad form" exclusionary clause voided coverage if any regu-




use of the aircraft for some criminal endeavor or other illegal activity.
Thus, coverage probably would be excluded if the flight was undertaken
to illegally smuggle narcotics into the country. Or perhaps a flight where
the aircraft was used as a "get-away" vehicle to escape from a crime or
pursuit of law enforcement officers would be excluded from coverage
because of the provision. Common sense reading of the policy leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the "unlawful purpose" exclusion must have
been intended to apply only to limited circumstances of such a criminal
nature.
As long as the "broad form" regulatory-violation exclusion was in the
policy, arguments were never raised by the insurer as to the "unlawful
purpose" provision. A detailed search of the opinions cited above, all
interpreting the exclusions of aviation policies, fails to disclose any mention
of a defense based on "unlawful purpose." But as soon as the "broad form"
regulatory-violation exclusion was omitted, the "unlawful purpose" exclu-
sion long forgotten, was dug up and given a new, vigorous lease on life.
Insurers then asserted the novel argument that if the pilot violated an
FAA regulation, his flight was illegal and, ipso facto, the aircraft was
"being used for an unlawful purpose." Thus, no coverage.
The first reported case of the "unlawful purpose" exclusion in an avia-
tion policy was Hall's Aero Spraying, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 274 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1960). There the evidence was that the
pilot, who was conducting crop-dusting operations, had violated regula-
tions of the Texas Department of Agriculture in failing to obtain a permit
and an equipment license. Liability claims were asserted against the insur-
ance carrier because of damage caused by the pilot's negligent spraying
operations. The carrier's defense was based on the "unlawful purpose"
exclusion. The Fifth Circuit, in a well-reasoned opinion, held that the
breach of the state regulations did not come within the "unlawful pur-
pose" exclusion. The purpose of the pilot was to conduct aerial spraying
operations, a lawful act; a regulatory infraction of the pilot did not render
his use of the aircraft unlawful or for an unlawful purpose.
The Hall's Aero Spraying decision is unimpeachable and most certainly
reached the correct result. But the next court to interpret the "unlawful
purpose" provision went awry. In Hedges Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 225 N.Y.S. 2d 779 (1962), the New York Supreme Court,
a trial-level court, had before it an aircraft property damage claim brought
by the aircraft owner against his insurance carrier. The insurer raised an
"unlawful purpose" defense on two grounds. First, it was alleged that the
pilot of the aircraft held only a student's license and, contrary to FAA
regulations governing student pilots, was carrying a passenger in the air-
craft. Second, it was contended that the aircraft was purchased on July 3,
the accident occurred on July 4, and the FAA was not notified of the
change of ownership until July 6, contrary to the regulations which require
a new owner to notify FAA upon purchase of the aircraft and prior to
making any flight. On these two grounds the argument was asserted that
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the flight of the aircraft was for an unlawful purpose and the court fol-
lowed the defense argument. As to the student pilot violation, the court
stated in dicta that if a passenger were on board the aircraft, the flight was
for an unlawful purpose, but that the evidence failed to establish that a
passenger was in fact on board. The court then held that because the in-
sured owner was three days late in filing his ownership registration papers
with the FAA-which, of course, had nothing to do with the accident-
there was no insurance coverage because the flight was for an unlawful
purpose. There is no reported appeal of the Hedges Enterprises case, and
thus the New York appellate courts apparently did not have the opportu-
nity to correct this astounding decision.
So far the "unlawful purpose" contention has not been discussed in any
other reported case, but has appeared in an unreported trial-court decision.
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Roach, Civil No. 19946 (S.D. Iowa,
1969) ,1 the exclusion was asserted as a defense based on the contention that
the pilot had not made "at least five takeoffs and five landings to a full
stop" at nighttime during the preceding 90 days prior to his flight' and
that he therefore had violated an FAA regulation governing nighttime
takeoff and landing proficiency. The evidence was that the pilot was well-
trained, skilled, and experienced, that the accident occurred en route be-
tween Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Omaha, Nebraska, and that in no
conceivable manner could the regulatory takeoff and landing proficiency
requirement have in any manner contributed to the accident. Neverthe-
less, the District Court held that because of the regulatory infraction the
flight was for an "unlawful purpose" and therefore was not covered by
the pilot's liability policy. The court expressly relied upon Hedges Enter-
prises and rejected Hall's Aero Spraying.
Cases in analogous areas have sometimes been urged as precedent for
interpreting the "unlawful purpose" exclusionary provision. However,
these other decisions are obviously distinguishable and not particularly
helpful.
The most closely related line of cases concerns fire insurance policies,
common in the 1800's and the early part of this century, that avoided
coverage if the insured property was used or occupied for an unlawful
purpose. These cases generally arose where the insurance company alleged,
following a fire, that whiskey was illegally manufactured or stored in the
insured building. See, e.g., Milonczyk v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 227
N.W. 873 (Wis. 1929), and Kelley v. Worcester Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 97
Mass. 284 (1867). Other allegations pertain to gambling, Concordia Fire
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 45 P. 722 (Kan. Ct. App. 1896), prostitution, and
the like.
Two observations are pertinent as to the old fire insurance cases. First,
it was generally recognized by the courts in those cases that, in order to
avoid coverage, the asserted illegal activity must have been conducted on
21 On appeal to the 8th Cir. Ct. of Appeals.
22 The facts were he had made six touch and go night landings within the last 120 days and
came closer to abiding by this archaic regulation than about 95% of the general aviation pilots.
[Vol. 36
AVIATION POLICY
a business basis or have been a habitual or permanent condition. Thus, in
Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, supra, the court expressly stated at
page 724: "We do not think the mere fact of occasional gambling in the
building, could, of itself, be said to be making an unlawful use thereof,
within the meaning of this condition of the policy. Something of a more
habitual or permanent character is doubtless contemplated." Second, the un-
lawful conduct alleged in those cases was of a criminal or at least extremely
serious nature. A more appropriate comparison with an infraction of one
of the numerous government regulations of flight activities, such as were
considered in the Hall's Aero Spraying, Hedges Enterprises, and Roach
cases, would be if the insured had unknowingly violated some technical
requirement of the city building code, without serious consequence and
certainly without any contribution to a later fire. It hardly seems con-
ceivable that any court would hold that such a minor flaw in the insured's
compliance with all the requirements of the law would amount to use of
his property "for an unlawful purpose."
Another related area is the cases concerning accident insurance policies
that exclude coverage if the loss occurred while the insured was engaged in
some unlawful act. See 45 C.J.S., Insurance Sec. 786 and cases cited therein.
These cases are quite distinguishable, however, and not in point. This
standard accident policy provision, excluding coverage if the insured was
doing some illegal act at the time of the occurrence, is far different from
an exclusion for use of an aircraft for an "unlawful purpose." Even though
an illegal act may have occurred during the course of the flight, whether
knowingly or unknowingly, this is certainly not decisive as to whether the
purpose of the flight was unlawful.
In the final analysis, this interpretation of the "unlawful purpose" ex-
clusionary provision must rest on the plain meaning of the words of the
exclusion. The aircraft must have been "used for an unlawful purpose."
Common sense dictates that such a phrase means that the flight was in-
tended to carry out some illegal scheme or criminal endeavor. The key
word in the phrase is "purpose," and this term indicates an actual design
or intention to carry out the crime. To have such a design means that
there must have been a deliberate determination made to conduct the
flight in order to accomplish the intended illegal mission. It does not
mean a mere infraction of some FAA regulation during the course of an
otherwise legal flight.
The "unlawful purpose" exclusion has been distorted by the insurer, and
by the trial courts in Hedges Enterprises and Roach, to mean no more than
an inadvertent breach of any FAA regulation. If this had been the true
intent of the provision, the policy draftsmen could very easily have said
just that instead of using the phrase "unlawful purpose." In fact, the
original "broad form" regulatory violation exclusion, which specifically
referred to a violation of any government regulation, also contained the
"unlawful purpose" provision. It is evident that the insurance companies
did not intend for the "unlawful purpose" exclusion to contemplate a
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mere regulatory infraction, or both provisions would not have been used
in the same policy. The courts should not permit the attempted broadening,
and distortion, of the "unlawful purpose" exclusion to mean something
that it obviously does not.
C. The Problem of Causal Relation
The cases frequently state that if there is a violation of a provision of
the policy, there will be no coverage, even though there is no causal rela-
tionship between the violation and the loss. The reasoning is that the
policy is a contract that expressly provides that if certain events occur,
there is no liability of the insurer; and when such an event does occur,
the exclusion then applies, period.
This harsh traditional view was followed by the Eighth Circuit and
Fourth Circuit courts in Globe Indemnity v. Hansen, 231 F.2d 895, 897
(8th Cir. 1956), and Bruce v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 222 F.2d
642, 645 (4th Cir. 1955). In each of these cases the evidence was that
the pilot had been engaged in aerobatics immediately before crashing his
aircraft into the ground. The FAR's permit a pilot to conduct such man-
euvers while carrying passengers only if the passengers are equipped with
parachutes. The passengers were not so equipped, and thus in each case
there was a showing of a regulatory violation. The policy carried by each
of the pilots contained the usual exclusion as to violation of government
regulations, and courts held that for that reason there was no coverage.
The plaintiffs argued that the required parachutes would not have saved
the lives of the passengers, and thus there was no causal connection be-
tween the regulatory infraction and the loss; but the courts in both cases
held that there was no necessity of showing such a causal relationship.
Another frequently-cited case, reaching the same result in a non-
aviation accident is Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 99
F.2d 485, 491 (4th Cir. 1938).
Happily, there are a number of state court cases (all non-aviation)
indicating that the courts will not blindly follow a literal, strict interpre-
tation of an insurance policy under such circumstances. These decisions
seem to apply an approach of "reasonableness," using language such as
"substantial compliance" with the policy requirements or breach of "mat-
ters of substance" or compliance is "to be determined by reasonableness."
Some examples of these more enlightened cases are:'
California Compensation E Fire Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n, 399
P.2d 381, 383 (Cal. 1965). The court stated: "Forfeitures on technical
grounds which bear no substantial relationship to an insurer's risk are dis-
favored. . . ." Although there may have been a technical violation of the
" See also: Kindervater v. Motorists Casualty Ins. Co., 199 A. 606, 608 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App.
1938); Johnson & Stroud v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 90 S.E. 124, 126 (N.C. 1916); Northern Ins.
Co. v. Morris, 165 N.E. 506 508-09 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929); Butler Candy Co. v. Springfield Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 146 A.2d 135, 138 (Pa. 1929); Karp v. Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 4 A.2d




policy terms, "the risk of the insurer under the policy is commensurate
with the premiums paid ......
Leach v. Farmer's Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 213 P.2d 920,
923 (Idaho 1950). Where the insured gave oral, rather than written,
notice to the insurance company 92 days after the accident, the court held
that there was a "substantial compliance with the policy." Further
"Violations of conditions by the assured will not release the insurer unless
it is prejudiced by the violation."
Continental Ins. Co. v. Thrash, 78 So.2d 344, 348 (Miss. 1955). The
Court rejected the insurer's disclaimer based on a violation of a fire policy
"iron safe" clause. "[C]ourts do not favor forfeiture of policies for purely
technical reasons . . . [A] substantial compliance [with the policy con-
dition] is all that is necessary."
Some states by statute require that a policy exclusion can be asserted as
a defense only if causation is shown. For example, Article 6.14 of the
Texas Insurance Code provides:
No breach or violation by the assured of any warranty, condition or pro-
vision of any fire insurance policy, contract of insurance, or applications
therefor, upon personal property, shall render void the policy or contract, or
constitute a defense to a suit for loss thereon, unless such breach or violation
contributed to bring about the destruction of the property. (Emphasis added).
Most statutes of this nature, like Texas, apply only to fire insurance.
However, some states have statutes of general applicability. The Nebraska
statute, for example, provides (Neb. Rev. Stat. 44-358):
• ..The breach of a warranty or condition in any contract or policy of
insurance shall not avoid the policy nor avail the insurer to avoid liability,
unless such breach shall exist at the time of the loss and contribute to the
loss, anything in the policy or contract of insurance to the contrary not-
withstanding. (Emphasis added).
In summary, it seems a harsh rule which allows an insurance carrier to
prove an exclusion in a policy and thus avoid coverage when that exclu-
sion has no relationship to the crash. It would seem more appropriate to
first, either require the insurance carrier to prove a causal relationship
between the facts which establish the exclusion and the crash, or second,
when an exclusion has been established the insured should be allowed to
come forward with evidence which establishes that there is no causal rela-
tionship between the facts establishing the exclusion and the crash.
By the same token, in those jurisdictions where the insured is required
to negate the policy exclusions, he should be allowed to retain coverage by
proving that there was no causal relationship if he cannot negate the claim
of a policy violation. There may be some instances in which an insured
cannot specifically negate the existence of a policy exclusion. However, he
can come forward with evidence which would establish that there was no
relationship between the facts which would establish that exclusion and
the crash.
In those instances where the courts have refused to void coverage and
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hold that there was "substantial compliance" with the terms of the policy
or that there was not a "breach of matters of substance" in the policy,
what they are really doing is saying indirectly that there was no causal
relationship between the facts relied upon by the insurance company to
show an exclusion and the facts which caused the crash. A more meaning-
ful approach would be to meet the issue head-on and hold that proof of
facts which establish a policy exclusion will not serve to defeat coverage
unless those same facts have a causal relationship with the crash.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing pages we have examined some of the problems which
are currently plaguing the general aviation pilots, owners and other in-
sureds. The ever increasing number of light aircraft being manufactured
and flown in this country indicates that these problems will not decrease in
the near future. As the aviation insurance purchasing public becomes more
sophisticated in their understanding of these problems, we can expect more
clarity, more purpose, and more meaningful provisions to become a part
of aviation policies.
By the same token, the design, maintenance and flight of aircraft are
becoming more complicated. This ever increasing complexity will provide
more and more insurance pitfalls. Armed with a thorough understanding
and knowledge of aviation policies and the applicable law, these traps can
be avoided.
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